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REVIEWS 
The Review Section ofE&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of 
brief reviews of books and articles (and perhaps films, etc.) that are concerned 
in some way with the rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human ani­
mals. The second part of this Section is entitled 'Replies' and contains comments 
on or responses to reviews published in earlier issues of E&A. By letter the 
Editor invites the authors of works reviewed to respond, and by this proclama­
tion in each issue invites all other interested readers to submit comments. The 
third part of the Reviews Section is a list of works of which reviews are invited. 
Any member who wishes to review any work in this continuing 'Reviews Needed' 
list should contact the Editor. 
Steve F. Sapontzis, "Are Animals Moral Beings?", American� 
Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1): 45-52 (Jan ua ry, 1980);� 
"A Critique of Personhood", Ethics 91 (4): 607-618� 
(July, 1981); "Must We Value Life to Have a Right to It?", � 
Ethics & Animals 3 (1): 2-11 (March, 1982)� 
Professor Steve Sapontzis has practice of moral assessment based on 
enriched the recent philosophical lit­ individual merit, rather than class 
erature with an original and carefully membership. 
reasoned defense of a very strong 
an imal rights position. He argues He begins his attack on the 
that animals are capable of performing received moral frame of reference by 
vi rtuou s acts, that they merit a sort noting that 'person' is a word with 
of moral respect which should be distinct "metaphysical" and "moral" 
expressed in our extending to them uses. The former use ('personhood­
the rights to "life, to dignity and to a d') is descriptive-it denotes a certain 
fulfilling life", and that the common class of things, on the basis of their 
tendency to regard all and only human possession of a particular cluster of 
beings as constituting a morally sig­- traits. Sapontzis claims that this use 
nificant class called 'persons' is denotes all and only human beings. 
wrong- headed. The challenge pre­- The latter use ('personhood-e') is 
sented to ordinary-and even to evaluative-it indicates those whose 
"enlightened"-views of. what is owing interests merit respect. Persons-e 
to an imals is, obviously enough, quite enjoy the right to life, to dignity, 
serious. and to fulfilling life; those who poss­
ess such rights are to be contrasted 
But Sapontzis' . challenge to stan­ with nature and property. 
da rd moral reflection goes yet deeper. 
"A Critique of Personhood" attacks an The humanist egalitarian perspec­
entire constellation of ethical views tive identifies these distinct uses of 
labeled 'humanist egalitarianism', 'person'. Hence, it holds that all and 
within which a conceptually confused only human beings are such that they 
and morally objectionable notion of enjoy the right to life, to dign ity and 
personhood is entrenched .He holds to a fulfilling life. Sapontzis carefully 
that th is concept and its context block shows just why this is an error.· He 
further moral progress and proposes sorts out the ki nds of claims someone 
that it be scrapped in favor of a might be making in identifying 
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person-d with person-e, considers 
arguments that could be brought in 
defense of the various types of iden­
tity claims, and concludes that they 
all fail. 
After observing that 'person-d' and 
'person-e' are not intensionally equiv­
alent (i.e., they are not synonomous, 
as 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are 
commonly taken to be), he goes on to 
claim that the terms do not pick out 
exactly the same set of objects-they 
are not extensionally equivalent, as 
are 'the Morning Star' and 'the Eve­
ning Star'. An assertion of exten­
sional equivalence could be maintained 
on three sorts of grounds: if, as a 
matter of fact, language users 
employed them to refer to the same 
set of things (which they don't, as 
witness the linguistic behavior of sla­
veholders) or if there were some log­
ical or linguistic rule to that effect 
(which there isn't, since any such 
rule would violate the principle that 
evaluations cannot be inferred from 
descriptions), or if there were a suc­
cessful "transcendental argument" with 
that conclusion. 
The burden of such an argument 
would be that the assumption of 
extensional equivalence is a necessary 
condition for the very possibility of 
morality; this might be the case if 
rationality were a necessary condition 
of a thing's being morally considera­
ble. But, as Sapontzis sees it, were 
this true, 'rationality' could then not 
mean 'ordinary human intelligence', 
for what is necessary for moral status 
is not intelligence of this sort, but 
rather the possession of vi rtues. 
Rationality in the sense of human 
intelligence cannot be a prerequisite 
for such status, since non-humans 
display such virtues as "love, self­
sacrifice, responsibility, moderation 
and parental concern" ("Critique", p. 
614). Hence, no transcendental argu­
ment trading on the idea of rationality 
will support the extensional 
equivalence of the two senses of 'per­
son' . 
Having sundered the two senses of 
person', Sapontzis concl udes by 
rejecting the moral relevance of onto­
logical status (except in the sense 
that the possession of some trait may 
be a necessa ry condition for the 
development of some moral vi rtue) . 
Thus, instead of engaging in the 
fairly common practice of extending 
the reference class of 'person-e' 
beyond "all and only human beings", 
he suggests that such categorical 
approaches to assigning moral status 
be replaced by a criterion centered on 
individual merit. "Moral status", 
Sapontzis writes, "is properly due, 
ea rned and lost on the basis of moral 
character, that is, on the possession 
of moral virtues, and on that alone" 
("Critique", p. 616) .. 
That animals are indeed virtuous is 
defended in "Are Animals Moral 
Beings?". 'Moral being' is there 
defined as any being capable of acting 
in a fashion that is morally worthy, 
and wh ich merits moral rights-namely, 
the familiar triad of life, dignity and 
a fulfilling life. On a strictly behavi­
orist view, animals often act in ways 
that would unhesitatingly be described 
as moral, i.e., as good or praisewor­
thy. But ou r hesitation to regard 
animals as moral actors is not so much 
a matter of whether thei r cou rageous, 
selfless or compassionate acts are 
morC!1 as acts. The major question is 
whether they are moral in the sense 
of indicating that animals are ethically 
assessible as agents, and hence, 
whether thei r actions deserve what­
ever extra moral merit is attributable 
to the good acts of moral agents. 
There are two ready lines of rea­
soning supporting· the contention that 
animals are not moral beings in the 
'agent' sense. The first of these 
takes reason to be a necessary condi­
tion for recognizing that an act has 
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moral value, and for engaging in the 
act because it has moral value. Only 
acts so understood and so motivated 
. a re acts of moral agents. The second 
line has it that rationality is a neces­
sary condition for acting freely, and 
that on Iy freely chosen acts can be 
moral ·acts in that sense. Sapontzis 
rejects both arguments. With respect 
to the fi rst, he notes that the 
requirement that a moral act proceeds 
. out of a recognition of its moral char­
acter demands on ly that the agent 
responds to the moral goods and evils 
of a situtation. It cannot plausibly be 
taken to demand that agents have the 
understanding of meta-ethical issues 
characteristic of moral ph i losophers. 
Granted this, what remains to be 
determined is whether animals ever do 
recogn ize and respond to the moral 
goods and evils of situations, or 
whether their actions proceed simply 
on the basis of instinct, or condition­
ing. 
Su rely, much a·nimal behavior can­
not be understood on the model of 
Pavlov's dogs, or the compulsive 
behavior of salmon swimmi ng upstream 
to mate. And we do seem ready to 
rega rd certai n sorts of more complex, 
more nuanced conditioned or instinc­
tive behaviors as morally valuable. 
Both maternal instincts and moral 
habits, e.g., count as· responses to 
moral goods and evils; both, says 
Sapontzis, are directed to accomplish­
ing a good, or alleviating an evil, and 
hence meet the common sense criterion 
for producing moral actions ("Moral 
Beings", p. 49). Further, some ani­
mal actions-say, the cases of por­
poises helping drowning sailors-must 
be regarded as spontaneous acts of 
k~ndness. Porpoises have not been 
conditioned to act so, and it seems 
unlikely that they could be responding 
to instinctual drives. 
What rationality in the sense of 
normal human intelligence does confer 
on its possessor is the ability· to 
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control and reconstruct both the world 
and the possessor. This is morally 
significant, since, on Sapontzis' view, 
a moral action is constituted as such 
by its being a part of a moral enter­
prise, part of the project of attaining 
an ideal way of life. He writes: 
Although many animals possess 
sufficient reason, sensitivity, 
or intelligence to recognize 
virtues and to do virtuous 
deeds, they seem to lack the 
ability to lead a dedicated 
moral life... While many of 
their actions are virtuous, ani­
mals are not moral beings, 
because these actions are not 
part of a moral life ("Moral 
Be i ng s", p. 50). 
But, although animals cannot act 
morally, and th us a re not moral 
beings, they ought still be regarded 
as objects of moral respect. Animals 
can act virtuously. In this respect, 
they are similar to God, who is taken 
always to act vi rtuously, but never to 
be striving to act better, or to the 
naturally well-disposed, who are vir­
tuous spontaneously rather than as a 
considered part of an idealistic enter­
prise. But, according to our common 
practice, such vi rtuous acts and vi r­
tuous actors a re worthy of ou r moral 
respect. Hence, animals who act vir­
tuously also deserve such respect; 
moral beings, in their quest to forge 
a morally better world, should extend 
. to them the rights to life, to dignity 
and to a fulfilling life. 
Sapontzis is concerned to minimize 
the significance of one's understand­
ing of the moral cha racter of one's 
acts, and of the freedom of one's 
choice in electing a given act from 
other alternatives. All that is 
required is that one act with regard 
to the goods and evils of the situ­
ation. This is altogether compatible 
with being unable to frame any 
account of what makes something mor­
ally good or evil, or of what moral 
120 E&A 111/4 
value is; as Sapontzis points out, 
ignorance of such matters is not lim­
ited to non-humans. The main posi­
tive criterion he seems to insist on in 
judging an act as a response to the 
goods and evils of the situation is 
that the agent is free of ulterior moti­
vations. But consider a machine 
whose flexible and sophisticated pro­
gramming allows it to respond to the 
moral goods and evils of a situ­
ation-say, a robot designed to recog­
nize and respond to situations which 
endanger children. Surely, our life­
saving robot will act on no ulterior 
motives. 
While there may well be a means 
for marking of the (presumably) 
non-virtuous behavior of the robot 
from the (putatively) vi rtuous behav­
ior of the dog, when they vie with 
each other over who will save a child 
from the fi re, it is not immediately 
clear how to do so on the basis of the 
present account. If we cannot do so, 
we are left with either including our 
robots into the sphere of moral 
respect, or drawing the distinction 
between the virtuous and the non-vir­
tuous nearer to the th reshold of 
humanity. It may well be that some 
understanding of one's act as being 
motivated by moral concerns is both 
necessary for it to be fully virtuous, 
and more characteristic of persons 
than Sapontzis admits. 
And should it be possible for ani­
mals to be vi rtuous, does that not 
indicate that they might be vicious as 
well? If so, the casuistry of our 
relationship with animals becomes even 
more complicated. If ordinary moral 
consciousness has tended to avoid 
bestowing full moral laurels on the 
dog who saves the child, so to has it 
tended to exculpate the bear who 
crushes a child. Has this bear for­
feited its right to life, dignity and a 
fulfilling life? 
Sapontzis may well be able to lay 
these worries to rest. Showing the 
moral insignificance .of the kind of 
thing a being is may be harder. 
Consider Sapontzis' use of the example 
of God to indicate that a being may 
not be a moral actor, but may yet be 
vi rtuous, and hence deserving of the 
rights to life, dignity and a fulfilling 
life. 
To say that God merits moral 
respect because of His virtue has an 
odd ring to it. At best, it seems· a 
very weak way of putting the point; 
at worse, it confuses respect with 
worship and adoration. But even if 
the kind of being God is does not 
preclude respect, it does preclude 
God's having any interests of the sort 
which could possibly need protection 
or acknowledgement in the form of 
rights to life, dignity and a fulfilling 
life. This suggests that the kind of 
being a virtuous actor is may be very 
important in determining in what man­
ner moral respect is appropriately 
tendered to it. It may further sug­
gest a means of resurrecting the moral 
utility of 'personhood', were it the 
case that persons have interests which 
other virtuous actors fail to have. 
In his most recent article, "Must 
We Value Life to Have a Right to It?", 
Sapontzis takes up the suggestion that 
persons may have interests which 
demand a certain kind of moral pro­
tection-say, a right to life-which ani­
mals do not deserve.· 
Ruth Cigman's "Death, Misfortune 
and Species Inequality" (Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 10 (1)) is Sapontzis' 
target; her argument is seen as "well 
on the way to becoming a classic 
among opponents of animal rights" 
("Must We Value Life. .", p. 2). 
Briefly, Cigman has it that em entity 
could have a right to life only if its 
death would be a misfortune to it, and 
death can be a misfortune only to 
those things which can value life 
itself. 
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This argument has been around for 
a while; one can see it plainly in the 
work of Michael Tooley (Cf. "Abortion 
and Infanticide" Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 2 (1)). Tooley defines 'per­
son' as "any being which has a right 
to life", and attempts to determine 
what is necessary to have a right, 
and a fortiori, the right. to life. Like 
Cigman, Tooley locates the answer in 
. the interests of the individual in 
question. In particular, it is at least 
a necessary condition of having a 
right to life, that one's interests be 
harmed by losing life, and this, Too­
ley claims, is only the. case for those 
beings who possess a cognitive capac­
ity sufficient to conceive of themselves 
as continuing subjects of experience, 
and to desire to remain so. This is a 
trait which is not had by all human 
bei ngs, and, as Tooley sees it, which 
may well be had by some non-human 
animals; hence, not all humans enjoy 
the right to life, and not all animals 
lack it. 
Such an account avoids many of 
the most perniCIOUS aspects of the 
humanist egalitarian moral framework 
Sapontzis criticizes in "A Critique of 
Person hood. " It does not identify 
. persons will "all and only human 
beings". Neither does it imply that 
the sphere of moral consideration 
abruptly ends at the demarcation 
between persons and non -persons. 
For, although non-persons may not be 
capable of the propositional attitudes 
requisite for death to be a harm to 
them, they may well have sufficient 
consciousness to experience pai n, and 
to wish to avoid it; that is, they may 
be sentient and hence have an inter­
est in remaining free of pain that 
moral agents have a prima facie obli­
gation to respect. 
But if it is not in being humanisti­
cally chauvinist that the Tooley-Cig­
man style position offends, it may 
offend in its egalitarianism-or so I 
believe Sapontzis might argue, in 
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keeping with his attack on the stan­
dard moral framework. A central 
moral notion for Tooley is harmful­
ness. In his earlier two articles, 
Sapontzis seems uninterested in harm­
fulness per se. His interest there is 
in merit. No class of creatu res ought 
to be accorded a certain set of 
"rights" as its due simply in virtue of 
its metaphysical properties; this is 
mere prejudice. So whether or not 
death is properly seen as a harm to a 
swarm of industrial and sociable bees, 
as it would su rely seem to be to an 
equal number of indolent, asocial. 
human felons is not to the point in 
determining what morality bids us do 
in ou r quest for a better world, it 
would seem. What is owing to .the 
members of a class is a matter of thei r 
individual worth. Hence, it would 
appear to follow, in a "burning build­
ing" situation, if you can save the 
inhabitants of one room only, save the 
bees. How can you consistently claim 
to value industry over indolence and 
cooperation over selfishness if you act 
otherwise? 
However, in "Must We Value Life to 
Have a Right to It?", Sapontzis seems 
to depart from his meritocratic moral 
perspective, and to enter a more cus­
tomary ethical arena, where the inter­
ests of individuals-and hence the kind 
of thing they are-become quite impor­
tant. Unlike Cigman, . he does not 
hold that "taking an interest in life"· 
is essential to death's being a misfor­
tune to any individual, but he is will­
ing to grant (at least for the purpose 
of this article) that having a right to 
x implies that lacking x is a misfor­
tune, and hence that any being una­
ble to experience the misfortune of 
not-x could not properly be said to 
have a right to x. This would seem 
to be the case even if the being in 
question were an appropriate subject 
of moral respect. As Sapontzis 
writes: 
The prejudice of speciesism 
does not lie in denying animals 
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the same set of rights enjoyed 
by humans. Animals have no 
interest in equal educational or 
vocationa I opportu n ities, so it 
would be nonsensical to sug­
gest that they shou Id sha re 
human rights to them. ("Must 
We Value. . ", p. 8) 
So it would seem, contrary to the 
position expressed in "A Critique of 
Personhood", that metaphysical prop­
erties, and hence. class membership, 
could be extremely relevant to moral 
status. Sapontzis argues that Cigman 
is incorrect in her view that death is 
a misfortune only to those beings 
which can value life itself; on his 
view, it is not necessary to take an 
interest in x in order to be harmed 
by the loss of it. It is sufficient to 
have an interest in x in order to be 
harmed by the loss of x. But surely, 
different kinds of beings will have 
different kinds of interest. 
Sapontzis supports his point 
against· Cigman by noting that we 
ascribe many kinds of right to humans 
too you ng, too damaged or simply too 
ignorant to be aware of what those 
rights protect. To the response that 
these putative counter-examples are 
abnormal, and hence do not disprove 
an analysis of rights predicated on 
normal cases, Sapontzis offers another 
counter-intuitive consequence of that 
view. Industrial pollution is a major 
source of animal suffering, and since 
animals are unable to understand the 
relationships between pollution and 
suffering, they must, on the view in 
question, be incapable of valuing a 
pollution free environment. But does 
it further follow that animals are not 
suffering a misfortune in losing 
healthy habitats? 
Sapontzis concludes that the inabil­
ity to understand what is causing one 
to suffer is morally unimportant where 
avoidable suffering is concerned. 
Hence, beings may well have rights to 
things which ". . . normal bein.gs of 
their kind are incapable of under­
standing and valuing" ("Must We 
Value ... ", p. 6). 
Sapontzis' view that one need not 
understand what is harming one to be 
harmed by it seems correct. But it 
might be argued that the evil of death 
is a special case; in order to be 
harmed by death, one must possess 
the kind of psychological concepts and 
cognitive capacities of the sort that 
Tooley and Cigman require. For how 
else are we to understand how death 
harms someone, if it is not by frus­
trati ng desi res that they have? As 
Epicu rus noted long ago, death, if a 
misfortune at all, is a curious kind of 
misfortune. It does not make anyone 
worse off, or prevent anyone from 
being better off, for there is simply 
no one for these comparative notion to 
be applied to (granted the assump­
tion, uncontroversial in the case of 
animals, that death is annihilation). 
Sapontzis argues that our general 
practice of judging death to be a mis­
fortune to the person who dies rests 
on the view that death eliminates any 
possibility of future happiness for the 
dead individual, not solely on the 
notion that death frustrates certain 
categorical ·desires. Since this con­
sideration applies equally to animals, 
it would seem inconsistent to withhold 
a similar judgment of misfortune in 
their case. 
However, the manner in which 
death eliminates any possibility of 
future happiness is logically odd, 
since it does so without making the 
pu rported su bject of th is misfortu ne 
any worse off. Death is not, after 
all, like being permanently immobilized 
in a sensory-deprivation chamber, still 
existing, yet unable to enjoy anything 
(to the best of our present knowl­
edge). So, if we are to continue to 
regard death as a misfortune for any 
creature, we will have to resolve the 
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problem that death removes the sub­-
ject of the harm. If the harm of 
death does not reside in the frustra­-
tion of a desi re to live, it is difficu It 
to see where it may be placed. 
Another complicating factor is sug­-
gested by Thomas Nagel's well-taken 
observation that it is not merely the 
quality of life that we value, but life 
itself, and that (in general) the loss 
of death cannot be reduced without 
remainder into the permanent loss of 
the possibility for further enjoyment. 
(Cr. Nagel's "Death", reprinted in 
his Mortal Questions (Cambridge, 
1979). Both these considerations-the 
possible role of the frustration· of cat­-
egorical desires and the value placed 
on life itself by those beings capable 
of conceptualizing life itself-suggest 
that there may· well be a morally 
important distinction between persons 
(not in the sense of "all and only 
human beings") and other animals, 
which may find defensible expression 
in the extension of a right to life to 
persons, but not to animals who fail 
to be persons. 
Another consideration raised by 
Sapontzis' work in "Must We Value 
Life to Have a Right to It?" mirrors 
that suggested by "Are Animals Moral 
Beings?": it is hard to shake the 
suspicion that Sapontzis may have 
proved too much. If it is not neces­-
sary to take an interest in something 
in order to have a right to it, we 
cannot be sure on these grounds that 
such moral reflexes as the restriction 
of the right to suffrage to persons 
James 
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have a respectable moral foundation. 
Su rely, on Sapontzis' account, animals 
have an interest in the results of 
election and legislation; they may well 
be subjected to otherwise avoidable 
suffering, depending on the outcome 
of many an election. Wou Id it not be 
more in keeping with Sapontzis' over­-
all program were he to suggest that 
animals be extended suffrage-exer­-
cised, of course, through human 
prox ies. Perhaps such proxies wou id 
have to satisfy some authority that 
they understood and were acting on 
behalf of animals' interests, insofar as 
that could be determined, and wou.ld 
exercise their proxy independently of 
their own right to participate in the 
electorial process. 
Sapontzis' work has the great merit 
of bringing to the readers' attention 
how deep speciesism penetrates. It 
lies not only at the base of actions 
and attitudes, but it affects reasoning 
as well; the very inferences that we 
draw are biased by species prejudice. 
But our -reflexive dismissal of voting 
rights for animals may indicate a sen­-
sitivity to something of real impor­-
tance; the ethical significance of tak­-
ing an interest in x. Just as persons 
(and presumably nothing else) place a 
special value on the 
sonal autonomy and 
butions to the social 
binds them together, 
special value on life 




so do they place 
itself. Such mat­-
in legitimately 
according special status 
conscious individuals, 
species. 
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